



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

October 4, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.

b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request.

We have located the enclosed records pertaining to Argentina Intelligence Services, ZF400004W. As a result of our review, it has been determined that the records are partially releasable to you. A copy is enclosed for your use. Fees for processing this request are waived.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of this review, 33 pages are denied in their entirety, as they are currently and properly classified SECRET according to Sections 1.3(a)(2) and 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 3.4(b)(1) of EO 12958 provides that classified information more than 25 years old is exempt from automatic declassification if it would reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of the source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.


During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

The enclosed page represents the total Army information concerning your request.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case #742F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Russell A. Nichols". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized 'R' and 'N'.

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF400004

As of 17 Aug 78 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

B Chenoweth 17 Aug 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

B Chenoweth 5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED BY ARCHIVIST
DATE: 061 0.5 1988

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MIRA
Form 315
1 Sep 72
June 75

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION
DATE: 061 0.5 1988
REVIEWED BY ARCHIVIST
A. Smith 920812

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 2-21

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USAID



U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

NOV 5 2001

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

RE: FOI-016/02

Dear Mr. Young:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information act (FOIA) request dated March 29, 2001, to the U.S. Army Intelligence & Security Command.

During the processing of your request, the U.S. Army Intelligence and security Command located one U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) document within their files. They referred the document to this agency for review and, if possible, direct release to you.

After a thorough review of the document it was determined that it could be released to you in its entirety. A copy of the document is provided for your use.

The enclosed document represents the entire file concerning your request. There is no charge for processing **this** request.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Joanne Paskar'.

Joanne Paskar, Chief
Information and Records Division
Office of Administrative Services

Enclosure: a/s

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*Return to Dept
of Army for Referral
to AID for D.R.*

A SURVEY
of the *Release State agent*
MAJOR POLICE
FORCES of
ARGENTINA

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

☐ : Retain classification. ☐ : Change/classify to:
☐ : With concurrence of:
☒ : Declassify ☐ : In part, and excise as shown by brackets.
Auth: E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.2, Sec. 3.1-8.
USAID/MIAS/ISS by: *FWB* Date: *5/1/98*

SECTION IV
Program Recommendations
to the
United States Government

February 1966

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

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SECTION IV

SURVEY

OF

MAJOR POLICE FORCES

OF

ARGENTINA

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SECTION IV

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FOREWORD

This survey of the major police forces of Argentina was conducted by the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development of the United States Government, at the request of the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the Argentine Government. Local arrangements for the survey were completed through the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission in Argentina.

Field work on the survey was started in Argentina by the Survey team on October 10, 1965 and completed December 22, 1965.

The information contained herein was obtained as a result of extensive studies and field observations of the respective police forces, plus discussions with their officers and men and with various governmental officials, military personnel, representatives of the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission in Argentina. This information is for the official use of the governments concerned in determining the feasibility of developing a joint police assistance program.

The survey is not intended to be critical of any person or group, but, rather, to be a factual statement of existing police problems and recommendations for their solution. The Survey Team regrets that the time available for this survey was not sufficient to deal in depth with the many problems and needs of the various police forces. It was only possible to cover the high points of each force and to limit recommendations to the most urgent problems.

All of the information in this report has been thoroughly checked. However, with the many complexities of police operations, the broad scope of the survey, language and translation difficulties, it is possible that certain mistakes may exist. For these, the Survey Team accepts full responsibility and hopes that they cause no serious difficulties or misunderstandings.

Sincere appreciation is expressed to the many persons who assisted in the conduct of the survey and who helped to make the Survey Team's stay in Argentina more enjoyable. These include the officers and men of the respective police forces, officials of the Argentine Government, the Ambassador and staff of the U.S. Embassy, the Director and staff of the USAID Mission in Buenos Aires, the U.S. Consul in Cordoba and many others.

Appreciation is expressed to Mr. Paul Katz of the Office of Public Safety, AID, Washington, Mr. Herbert Hardin, Chief U.S. Public Safety Advisor in Colombia, Mr. Robert L. Barnes, U.S. Area Public Safety Advisor in Brazil and Mr. Adolph Saenz, Chief U.S. Public Safety Advisor in Uruguay, who came to Argentina and assisted in certain aspects of the survey. Special thanks are expressed to Comandante Hector D. Yemmi of the Gendarmeria, Inspector Hector V. Morel of the Federal Police, Prefecto Nestor Mario Alonzo of the National Maritime Prefecture and Inspector Guillermo Remos Mejia of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police. These officers rendered invaluable service as the liaison representatives of their respective police forces and in many other important respects.

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The members of the Survey Team appreciated the opportunity to participate in this important project and they hope that the survey will be useful in helping to solve the problems toward which it was directed.

JOSEPH L. LINGO, Chief of Survey Team

MARION N. HARDESTY, Associate

January 25, 1966

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INTRODUCTION

Acting on the request of the Government of Argentina, as transmitted to the United States Embassy and AID Mission in Buenos Aires, the Office of Public Safety of AID/Washington recently completed a factual study and report on the major police forces of Argentina. This survey included the Federal Police, The Provincial Police of Buenos Aires, the National Gendarmeria, the National Maritime Prefecture, with incidental comments on other provincial police forces.

The objective of the study was to provide complete and factual information on the organization, training, operations, problems and needs of the Argentine security forces to be used as a basis for recommendations which would help to:

1. Improve police public safety activities and capacities to handle problems of subversion, civil disorder, insurgency and other threats to internal security;
2. Point out any need for additional financial backing of the police by the Argentine Government and to indicate priority problems and needs demanding such support; and
3. Serve as a basis for any potential police assistance program developed in cooperation with the Government of the United States.

The basic survey recommends that a program of police technical assistance and training be agreed upon between the two governments and that limited amounts of modern police equipment be provided to the Argentine police forces. The Survey Team feels that much could be accomplished through such a joint program that would serve, not only to improve safety and security operations in Argentina, but would be extremely important to the security objectives of both governments and to the inter-American collective security system.

Much of the information which follows is supplemental to that contained in the survey previously mentioned. Certain classified information, personal observations and opinions of the Survey Team, and specific suggestions regarding the nature and extent of the joint assistance programs, are included. Also included are the specific conclusions and recommendations regarding each of the Argentine police forces, which the Survey Team feels should be given major consideration in the development and implementation of such a joint police assistance program between the two governments.

It should be pointed out that the basic survey will be made available to the police forces and government officials of Argentina. This report is classified and is only for the use of the United States Government.

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SITUATION SUMMARY IN ARGENTINA

The major police forces of Argentina, while potentially capable of handling problems of public safety and internal security in an effective manner, must be greatly improved if this potential is to be fully realized. This capacity has been allowed to deteriorate in recent years in each of the major forces due to lack of budgetary support by the government, with the resultant low salaries and serious shortages of capable manpower and modern equipment. In the Federal Police, for example, police patrols have been reduced fifty per cent since 1930, while the city's population has more than doubled during the same period.

Other threats to police effectiveness include a cumbersome and bureaucratic legal system and judicial process which tends to favor the criminal rather than the police; a lack of strong and clear legislation, especially with regard to certain federal crimes such as contraband, immigration and internal security matters; governmental influence on police operational and enforcement policies, depending on the current political climate; poor public relations and a lack of information about modern public safety and internal security operations. In other cases, when such information is known, police interest has been lacking because of the unavailability of the facilities and equipment required to implement such projects. Police training has been highly pedantic and academic and not designed to meet the practical needs of the service. Modern visual aids and other teaching equipment are practically non-existent, except a limited amount of such equipment in the National Maritime Prefecture.

While the police forces have, through dedication and improvisation, been able to keep going, they have not been able to even begin to meet their potential capabilities for dealing with current problems of crime and subversion.

As police capacities have deteriorated during recent years, crime rates and internal security problems have been increasing rapidly in all parts of the country. Details on the nature and extent of these problems are contained in the basic study and report.

While no known active insurgency exists in Argentina at present, the experience in the northern province of Salta in 1964 is indicative of what may happen in the future. This incident involved a group of Castro Communists who attempted to establish operations in Salta. The guerrillas were well armed and offered strong resistance when encountered by the Gendarmeria who completely neutralized the subversive group, although one gendarme was killed in the action.

Potential insurgents in the country include such groups as the Castro Communists, the Communist Party, the Revolutionary Peronists and extremists like the Tacuara as well as various rightist groups. Other potential troublemakers include the many Bolivian and Paraguayan exiles and workers in the southeast and the large numbers of illegal aliens from neighboring countries who have settled in the slum areas surrounding Buenos Aires and other large cities.

The Communist Party in Argentina is one of the largest in Latin America with an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 members. Communist activities are well defined and follow the general pattern of infiltration, propaganda, promoting labor and student

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unrest, and provoking violence when and where suitable to its interests. The presence of other strong extremist groups in Argentina add to the problem of public safety and internal security. Terrorist action in the provinces is a frequent occurrence. Mob violence and illegal strikes in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires area are ever-increasing problems which are of concern to police officials. Federal Police officials have stated that rioters appear to be getting more aggressive and offer more resistance than in the past. This situation will require effective application of force so as to prevent serious injuries to persons involved and prohibit the creation of martyrs for propaganda purposes. It appears that the Communists and Castroites have no great political strength at present except insofar as they might be able to act in conjunction with Peronist elements. During 1964-1965, Peronist labor leaders sought to foment public repudiation of and discontent with the Illia administration through a concerted program of strikes and mass demonstrations. They hoped to make capital of their sponsorship of the working-class interests. The government, through a combination of conciliatory measures, maintenance of law and order and avoidance of violent repression was able to hold on. Non-Peronist labor elements declined to support the campaign and Peronist support weakened.

Communist infiltration into labor, universities, student groups, intellectual and cultural groups, and poor segments of the populace is generally well traced by police and military agencies. However, this is a difficult task which requires a constant application of effort and evaluation of results. Police forces involved in these operations require training, modern equipment and a knowledge of up-to-date techniques and methods.

The vast territorial extent of Argentina, the rugged terrain in rural areas, which varies from hot to cold, from jungle to rough mountain country, and its relative position to five neighboring countries, makes it not only vulnerable to smuggling operations and clandestine movement of persons but also to guerrilla-type activity.

Internal security is the primary responsibility of the Federal Police, the Gendarmeria, the Maritime Prefecture and the 22 provincial police forces of the country. These forces are supported by the armed services in the event of a large-scale uprising or insurrection. Within the limitations which have been pointed out, the police forces of Argentina are relatively effective and represent well-organized forces capable of coping with most threats against the internal security of the country. Additional comments on the capacity of each of the respective forces are included on other sections of this report.

The Survey Team believes that:

1. While there may now be no clear and present danger of a subversive takeover in Argentina, the volatile nature of the present situation demands a stepped-up capacity on the part of all police forces to deal with such problems.
2. There is a drastic need for improvement in police training, operations and equipment to deal with the rapidly-rising crime rate and potential threats to internal security in the country.
3. A relatively small joint program of technical assistance and training with the U.S. Government, plus the provision of limited amounts of equipment, would greatly serve to supplement present police efforts and improve police capabilities to deal with present and future problems of crime and subversion.

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Each official of the Argentine police forces expressed a sincere interest in receiving technical assistance and training from the United States and their desire to participate and cooperate in any joint police assistance program which might be developed. Similar expressions of cooperation and participation were expressed by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior of the Argentine Government in meetings with the Survey Team and U.S. Embassy officials in Buenos Aires.

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- IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CENTRAL
JERSEY COUNTY, ILLINOIS

5. Improve the quality of police training and to develop the effective use of audio-visual aids, modern teaching materials, case studies and practical field practice, including the handling and use of police weapons. Also, to assist in the development of a central police training facility for the use of all police forces of Argentina.

6. The improvement of police capacity to deal with civil disorders and other problems of internal security through training and technical assistance and the provision of limited chemical munitions and other special equipment.

7. Assist in the expansion of the country-wide criminal and security activities of the Federal Police to assure the more effective handling of such additional crimes as contraband, auto theft, narcotics, white slavery and others of a federal nature.

The Provincial Police of Buenos Aires

1. The modernization of police communications for highway patrol use and for tactical use of riot control and mounted police units.

2. Improved police training including the addition of more police-type subjects in the instructional programs and the development of an effective audio-visual program, field practice, case studies and weapons handling instruction.

3. Assistance in the modernization of information files and records and in the development of more effective intelligence training activities.

4. The improvement and expansion of foot and motor patrol activities and the development of information for police planning activities in this area.

5. Assistance in improving the capacity of the police to deal with mobs and riots, terrorism and other internal security problems, including the development of special training programs for the police units responsible for such activities.

National Gendarmeria

1. The improvement of communications for tactical border patrol operations and for the effective coordination of administrative communications with the country-wide network of the Federal Police.

2. Assistance in the expansion of present intelligence activities, particularly in the border areas of the country, to deal with problems of smuggling and illegal entry of persons and in the modernization of files and records used for intelligence operations.

3. The improvement of police training activities and the addition of more police-type subjects in the various school courses. Also, the development of an audio-visual and expanded police library program.

4. Assistance in the planning and operation of border control and checking activities and in the development of more effective methods of coordination and control of smugglers and illegal entry of persons with both the customs and immigration services of Argentina.

5. The improvement of the Gendarmeria's capacity to handle counterinsurgency, civil disorders, terrorism and other internal security problems through tactical instruction in the use of modern techniques and weapons.

National Maritime Prefecture

1. The improvement of tactical communications for the more effective control of smuggling and illegal entry of persons in border areas under the jurisdiction of the agency.

2. Assistance in border patrol planning and operational activities with special emphasis on the expansion of land, air and water patrols and modernization of present patrol equipment.

3. The expansion of intelligence activities, particularly in river border areas, and improvement of files, records and equipment used for information gathering activities.

4. Assistance in the development of a capacity to deal with mobs, riots and other subversive activities in the port areas under its jurisdiction and an added capacity to handle counterinsurgency operations in the frontier areas.

BASIC ELEMENTS AND COST OF PROGRAM

A. Technicians

Five U.S. technical advisors, one administrative assistant and one U.S. secretary are needed to provide the basic staff for the joint program. This staff should be supplemented, as needed, to deal with specialized or highly technical problems, by TDY personnel. At the outset, full-time technical advisors are needed in the following areas of specialization:

Chief Advisor, who is a police generalist with wide background in police organization and management and with experience as a police administrator and a broad understanding of internal security problems.

Communications Advisor, who understands police security problems in relation to communications and who is thoroughly familiar with both municipal and country-wide communications systems.

Training Advisor, who has a good knowledge of police training, including methods of instruction and use of audio-visual aids. He should also have a familiarity with modern police procedures and methods, including internal defense training activities.

Investigations Advisor, who is thoroughly familiar with modern investigative techniques and information gathering and evaluating activities. He should also be able to assist the various intelligence agencies in the development of effective filing and record procedures.

Patrol Advisor, who is thoroughly familiar with modern patrol planning and operations and is capable of assisting in the development of patrol information through the use of modern data processing machines.

The estimated cost of the six advisors plus one U.S. secretary and TDY assistance is indicated below by year:

<u>Technical Advisors</u>			
<u>FY 67</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>
\$157,040	\$155,000	\$157,000	\$155,000
<u>TDY Assistance</u>			
15,960	15,000	15,000	15,000
<u>TOTALS</u>			
\$173,000	\$170,000	\$172,000	\$170,000

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B. Training

The estimated cost of training participants in the U.S. and third countries is as follows:

<u>Participants</u>			
<u>FY 67</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>
\$72,000	\$49,500	\$43,000	\$41,000

It is suggested that during FY 67, a total of 28 participants be selected and sent to the U.S. for study and observation of modern police methods and operations as follows:

Federal Police

- 1 Officer to study modern instructional methods and visual aids at IPA.
- 1 Officer to senior course at IPA.
- 1 Officer to FBI National Academy
- 2 Police Executives for observation of police identification and record procedures, police communications and patrol operations.
- 2 Junior Officers to study telecommunications management (10 months)
- 1 Officer to study police motor patrol operations with special attention to communications and dispatching methods.

Buenos Aires Provincial Police

- 1 Officer to Senior Course at IPA.
- 2 Officers to General Course at IPA.
- 1 Officer to study highway patrol operations with special attention to communications.

Other Provincial Police

- 2 Officers to General Course at IPA.

National Gendarmeria

- 4 Officers to General Course at IPA with specializations in border control and internal security operations.
- 1 Officer to Senior Course at IPA.

2 Ranking Officers for observation and study visits to the U.S. with special emphasis on emergency riot control and counterinsurgency operations.

2 Officers to study communications management.

National Maritime Prefecture

1 Officer to study border patrol operations (3 months).

2 Officers to General Course at IPA with specialization in border patrol.

It is estimated that the cost of this participant training would be approximately \$72,000 for FY 67. Participants in future years should be selected as needed to assist in the solution of certain basic police and security problems in the joint program.

Note: Plans should also be developed, in close coordination with U.S. military attaches and U.S. Military Assistance Group in Argentina, to send selected participants from the Gendarmeria and Prefecture to study emergency crowd control and counter insurgency operations at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, or Panama, or other military training centers.

C. Equipment

The major item of equipment for the entire period of this proposed program is police communications. This has been indicated as a top priority item by each of the local security forces and is a vital need if public safety and internal security objectives are to be realized. The estimates for basic communications needs are as follows:

Federal Police Communications

<u>FY 67</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>
\$150,000	\$100,000	\$75,000	\$50,000

Buenos Aires Provincial Police Communications

75,000	50,000	25,000	15,000
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National Gendarmeria Communications

200,000	150,000	100,000	75,000
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National Maritime Prefecture Communications

150,000	100,000	55,000	25,000
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TOTALS

\$575,000	\$400,000	\$255,000	\$165,000
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1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 278: 1039-1044.

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Equipment

Equipment

TOTALS

TOTALS

It is strongly recommended that any equipment provided by the U.S. Government, other than communications, be largely for demonstration, operational or training purposes and closely associated with a particular technical project in the


joint program. No highly technical or special use equipment should be provided unless the police forces are capable of using it effectively or unless technical assistance is made available to train local personnel in its use.

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PROGRAM GUIDELINES

While all of the police forces included in this report have an important role in the country's internal security situation, it is believed that special attention in any joint program should be given to the basic problems and needs of the Federal Police and the National Gendarmeria. These forces have broad country-wide responsibilities for both crime and internal security problems and the best potential for effective development. Secondary attention should be given to the Provincial Police of Buenos Aires, largely because of its specific internal security responsibilities in the highly strategic Greater Buenos Aires area and to the Maritime Prefecture for its important port and border patrol functions. Special consideration should also be given to those projects which will best serve to strengthen overall police activities and provide more effective coordination between the various police forces, including other provincial police units.

It is hoped that many of the problems and needs of the National Maritime Prefecture can be included in the U.S. Military Assistance program with AID assistance limited chiefly to technical help in a few specific police activities and the provision of certain basic training in public safety and internal security subjects.

As a part of the Joint Program, it is believed that the Argentine Government should agree to provide much needed additional financial assistance to the public security forces. Such support should greatly exceed that provided by the U.S. Government. The entire U.S. effort and any U.S. equipment provided should be predicated on the willingness of the GOA to accept its responsibility for additional backing of the police forces and be spelled out in detail in any program agreements developed by the two governments.

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THE POLICE FORCES OF ARGENTINA

A. The Federal Police

The Federal Police of Argentina is composed of 22,560 officers, agents and civilians. It has the basic responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the Federal Capital (Buenos Aires). In addition, it is responsible for the enforcement of laws dealing with federal crimes and for certain intelligence activities in all parts of the country.

Specific conclusions and recommendations for improving the organization and operations of the Federal Police were submitted in the basic survey and are also included herein, as follows:

Conclusions on Federal Police

1. The Federal Police is a highly professional police agency composed of experienced and dedicated officers and agents, who are attempting to do a capable police job under extremely difficult conditions.

During recent years, the Federal Police have been forced to limit and curtail many basic police operations, due largely to serious shortages of manpower, facilities and modern police equipment. The tremendous growth of population in the Federal Capital, together with social, political and economic developments throughout the country, has created a multitude of new problems for the Federal Police. These problems are further intensified by increased threats to the country's internal security and a rapidly rising crime rate. Although police officials are generally aware of these problems and what needs to be done toward their solutions, they have not been provided with even the minimal facilities and equipment needed for their solution. In trying to keep up, the police have been forced to resort to partial and piecemeal solutions which have proven far from adequate. This failure on the part of the government to provide financial backing and support for police efforts has resulted in a steady lessening of police effectiveness, which has reached alarming proportions and could be a serious factor in the country's internal security situation.

2. The threat of civil disorders, subversion and terrorism in the Federal Capital and Provinces is potentially serious and calls for the best efforts of the police. It is believed that the police will have a good capacity to deal with these problems if additional technical assistance, training and modern equipment is provided.

3. The present system of written court trials is less efficient than the oral trial system and places an undue burden of report preparation and bureaucratic activity on the police.

While this report does not include a study of the judicial processes of Argentina, it is believed that this is a valid conclusion which has a direct relation to police operations. Consideration should be given to changing the court system along lines of oral trial procedures now used in many countries.

[REDACTED]

4. The basic organizational structure of the Federal Police is sound and meets the needs of the service in most regards.

Duties are well defined and police functions seem to be allocated along logical lines in the various Directorates. There is, however, some question regarding the wide span of control now exercised by the Chief of Police who has at least 15 persons reporting to him.

5. Due to the difficulties encountered in recruiting new police and civilian personnel, low salaries and other problems, there has been a tendency in recent years to assign trained police officers and agents to various administrative and service activities at the expense of actual police operations like patrol and criminal investigation. The relatively low police salaries have also not been conducive to the recruitment of the best quality of personnel for the police service.

6. Traffic control and supervision in the Federal Capital leaves much to be desired and does not even meet the minimal needs of a large metropolitan city. This situation is rapidly becoming chaotic as more and more vehicles go on the streets.

7. The Riot Squad and Mounted Police units have a long record of effectiveness in the prevention and control of civil disorders, mobs and riots.

Training is good, and personnel are well disciplined and efficient. Additional communications equipment, chemical agents and weapons are needed if these units can be expected to continue to operate effectively.

8. One of the serious defects in police service at present is the lack of effective foot and motor patrol operations in the city.

While this is due in part to shortages of manpower and equipment, it is believed that more effective use could be made of the patrol vehicles presently available and used only for reserve or special purposes.

9. There is a need to strengthen and enlarge the facilities of the police records and identification service into a center for the entire country to expedite the issuance of passports and other identity documents and to coordinate criminal identification and record activities on a country-wide basis.

Such a project would help to coordinate and strengthen federal, provincial and other police identification and record activities and would provide a valuable uniform crime reporting service for the police of the entire country. At present, separate criminal records are maintained by the Federal Police, the National Gendarmeria, the National Maritime Prefecture and the 22 Provincial Police forces. If a person from the interior is arrested in Buenos Aires, for example, it is necessary to communicate with the respective police agencies to get full information on his criminal record or background.

10. Investigative operations have become highly specialized by type of crime and each of the specialized investigative squads has been allowed to build up its own particular activity with little or no coordination with the other squads.

Each squad maintains its own special records, photographs and files. There has also been a lack of coordinated action between the investigative squads, the

[REDACTED]

police precincts and the various patrol forces. There is a vital need for additional investigative equipment and for vehicles to allow investigators to operate effectively.

11. The countrywide responsibilities of the Federal Police have not been allowed to reach the potential necessary to deal effectively with federal crimes in the entire country.

While the Directorate of Federal Coordination has operated successfully in regard to its information gathering and intelligence duties, it is believed that additional legislation and expanded police effort to deal with federal crimes is a vital need on a countrywide basis. Such additional effort could be extremely effective in dealing with such crimes as contraband, auto theft, transport of stolen goods across provincial boundaries and others.

12. Basic training for agents and officers is well developed but limited in both quality and quantity of practical police subjects.

There is a definite need to improve training facilities, teaching methods and materials. More audio-visual aids should be provided and more practical police type subjects included in the training programs.

13. The Survey Team believes that the basic responsibility for dealing with the problems mentioned above rests with the people and government of Argentina. The Team also believes that a joint program of police assistance with the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development of the United States Government would prove extremely useful in helping to supplement local efforts toward police improvement and would aid in making both the crime and security aspects of police operations more effective.

14. While the management and technical competence of the Federal Police communications organization is more advanced than most of the Latin American countries, the enormous communications responsibilities placed upon this organization without proper budgetary support have seriously limited their capability of providing rapid and reliable communications.

15. The Federal Police administrative and security country-wide radio network can not provide the reliability or traffic capacity required for the following reasons:

- a) This communications network operates for the most part in the radio-telephone mode and subsequently cannot handle the traffic load required.
- b) An insufficient number of technical supervisory personnel at the field offices, and the use of antiquated equipment, contribute to the general unreliability of this network.

16. The operational capability of the radio patrol car communication system is far less than that required to support Federal Police operations in Buenos Aires. Over 75% of the radio equipment in use, both mobile and base, is obsolete and unreliable. While Control Center facilities are presently inadequate, the police are constructing a new control center which, when completed, will satisfy their current requirements.

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Page(s) 97-120



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-4,070/ISM-1(FOIA)

7 April 2003

Mr. John Young
Crptome.org
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

M. 6600114A
22, 115, 116, 118,
119, 120

Dear Mr. Young:

This responds to your request under the Freedom of Information Act dated 29 March 2001. Therein you requested records from the Army concerning Argentina Intelligence Services, ZF400004W. In processing your request, Army located 5 records within the purview of DIA and forwarded them to us on 4 October 2001 for review and direct response to you.

Upon review, it has been determined that some portions of three of the documents are not releasable. The portions withheld are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6), Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b)(1) applies to information properly classified under the criteria provided by Executive Order 12958. Subsection (b)(2) applies to information which pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of the agency. Subsection (b)(3) applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statute is 10 U.S.C. Section 424. Subsection (b)(6) applies to information which if released would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals. All reasonably segregable portions of the documents are attached hereto.

All substantive portions of the remaining two documents are not releasable. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), Freedom of Information Act. There are no reasonably segregable portions of this exempt material.

You are advised that a requester may appeal, within 60 days, an initial decision to withhold a record or part thereof. Should you wish to exercise this right, you may do so by referring to case #0069-02 and addressing your appeal to:

Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: ISM-1(FOIA)
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Sincerely,


ROBERT P. RICHARDSON
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff

3 Enclosures a/s

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be crafted or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

2. SUBJECT: National Intelligence Center Legalized

9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 March 1973

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED] (b)(2)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 9 March 1973

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

(b)(2) 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: 10 March 1973

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE [REDACTED]

14. APPROVING AUTH: [REDACTED]

(b)(2) 7. SOURCE: Press [REDACTED]

18. SUMMARY:

(Leave Blank)

GOA law 20.194 was announced 9 March establishing a National Intelligence Center. The Intelligence Center will have elements from several collection agencies including those of SIDE, the Armed Forces and the Federal Police. Other sectors of government will participate as required in their areas of interest. The Center will be directed by a committee formed for the base organizations and will be presided over by a commander of Flag rank. The presiding officer will be titled Chief of National Intelligence and will be at Secretary level. The new chief will be named by the President based on the nomination by the Joint Commanders of the Armed Forces.

1. FUNCTIONS: The National Intelligence Center will plan, orient, centralize and coordinate strategic intelligence production using assets of other intelligence services.
2. Induce and maintain a general appreciation for strategic Intelligence
3. Distribute strategic intelligence to the Executive, the National Security Council, the Military Committee, and the organs of planning and execution of National Security.
4. Formulate and maintain doctrine on national intelligence.

COMMENT: This law formalizes an already functioning ad hoc group and appears primarily an effort to put affairs in order before the change of government. This law replaces article 25 of GOA Law 16.970.

15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

(b)(2) [REDACTED]

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1 SEP 62

REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 50,
OPNAV FORM 5528 (Rev 10-61),
AF FORM 112, JUL 51, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 55.

Card

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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COUNTRY ARGENTINA

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT 65-208 906 Argentine Army SIE and SSE (b)(2)

DATE OF REPORT 21 July 1960

NO. OF PAGES 3 013669

DATE OF INFO July 1960

REFERENCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ
EVALUATION
SUMMARY

July 1960

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(b)(2) Report forwards information on structure and functions of SIE and SSE

with estimate of current capabilities. (SECRET)

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1 Incl
Chart - SIE and SSE (b)(2) (NOFORN)

1. The Argentine Army Intelligence Service (SIE) is divided into two groups, the Army Intelligence School and an organization of intelligence agents with field offices throughout the country. The overall intelligence effort of the Army's Servicio de Informaciones del Ejercito (SIE) is apparently confined to operations within the country of ARGENTINA. Exterior operations are the responsibility of Division II, Argentine Army General Staff through its control of the attache system, in coordination with the responsibility of Secretaria de Informaciones del Estado (SIE) which employs agents overseas in a manner similar to the United States CIA.

2. The director of the SIE, at present a colonel, base branch Cavalry, reports directly to the Secretary of Army. His school operates through a sub-director, at present rank of colonel, and produces officer and non-commissioned officer graduates for duty as intelligence officers at all levels within the Army including General Staff and, in addition, agent officers to serve in the Servicio de Seguridad del Ejercito, Security Service of the Army (SSE). The SSE is apparently an undercover organization similar to the secret service employed by Peron but operated under regulations which minimize its interior spying activity on units of the Army and maximizes its ability to keep check on subversive activities, be they in guise of peronism, communism, or an incipient "golpe" against the government.

3. SSE officers are not openly identified although they are probably known to the commanding generals of each major field command, division and army and to the commanding officers of the Military Regions. The SSE officers presumably have stations near all major Army field commands and, likewise, in the major urban areas.

[Handwritten signature]

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(b)(2)

They maintain liaison with the unit intelligence officers at Army and divisional level. If required by any unit commander, they will place agents within the unit to counteract reported subversive activities.

4. It is presumed that Major David René CARRERA whose house was bombed recently in the suburb of Olivos, Buenos Aires, resulting in the death of a child, was an active SSE officer. It is even said that the force of the explosion in his home was increased by stores of explosives which he himself was keeping within his house. At any rate he is said to have led severe action in the past against various peronist labor organizations and for this he was marked for retaliation.

5. The SSE organization as well as the School of Information is centered and directed from an open office building in BUENOS AIRES. There is no attempt to conceal the identity of these two buildings. This is typical of the Naval Intelligence School or SIN as well as the SIIA. However the number of SSE agents is not known to [REDACTED]

It is estimated they are numerous.

(b)(1)

It is noted that this same request i.e. for high-level staff guidance against communism, has been received from General Staff officers. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

The most recent expression of interest from the General Staff has been as to the operation of the U. S. Army Psychological Warfare School.

6. There is apparently no central clearance system operated by the Argentine Army. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] expressed confidence that the Argentine Army did not need to use such a system for its officer corps because of the system of induction through the National Military Academy and the close relation which exists within a small officer corps. Neither were they concerned about the NCOs, although they admitted that occasionally they were required to place known communist sympathizers at unimportant posts. All NCOs are inducted through an Army Academy 4-year course.

7. The orientation of the Argentine Army intelligence effort is believed to be the result of the Army's pre-occupation with a threat of revolutionary warfare. Although five years have elapsed since the ouster of Perón, the Army believes that still exists within the country a peronist base within the laboring class which could be exploited either from within or without the country by the type of undisciplined leadership which emerged in CUBA. Communism is believed a threat inasmuch as it would exploit this peronist mass or control the leaders. The Argentine Army believes that communism will never penetrate the Argentine Army officer corps and will always be partially checked in public by the Catholic Church. The Army advocates a stern policy by the Federal Government both in eradicating communists from the key positions to which it is believed it is now infiltrated and in suppressing peronist revival. The Army believes that communism has already entered its second phase of activity in ARGENTINA, that is, that the government, the Police force and the schools have been infiltrated. It is a duty then of the SSE to report on this immediately within the country and it was probably based upon their reports that Secretary of Army LARCHER was so outspoken in his criticism of the government of CORDOBA several weeks prior to the implementation of the CONITES Plan. Likewise this plan and the subsequent federal intervention of the Province of CORDOBA was in large based on intelligence developed by the SSE. To date, however, there has been very little publicity about the activities of these agents and all public statements have been made by the line commander concerned. In the case of CORDOBA the Fourth Division Commander, General LANDA, obviously primed with information, spear-headed the Army's criticism of the Government of CORDOBA.

COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

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
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FROM

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EXC



Commandant SIE - Colonel Maric Oscar GARCIGAST

Commandant Intelligence School - Colonel Jorge M. SFI

Chief SSE - Colonel Radi MUJEZ

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[SSE - Army Security Service]

1. Argentine Army Servicio de Informaciones (SIE) does control type CIC organization from central intelligence school operated in Buenos Aires to include regional offices for SSE (Servicio de Seguridad Del Ejercito). SSE organization parallels army organization estimated to division level probably covering all important population centers. Note that SSE officer is not a member of local unit staff but functions directly under control of commandant for service of security who has office at information school in Buenos Aires. Note also SSE officers now prohibited use under cover agents within army units without knowledge commander. Other-wise mission of SSE similar to USCIC.

2. Estimate total number officers active within SSE under 30 based upon overall information school output of which SSE personnel constitute minority. Apparently SSE organization at one time included secret agents but these
- (b)(1) disbanded subsequent Peron. [REDACTED] believes communist infiltration of Argentine Army officer and NCO rank non-existent. (To indicate control by SSE cited one recent 1957 case of an officer dismissed from army for liaison with notorious woman communist) based on system of selection
- (b)(1) of officers and length of training three years [REDACTED] estimates SSE should constitute efficient corps but note that principal objective is detection sources revolutionary warfare outside of army. Reliance upon national military academy and NCO schools plus general knowledge of individual reputation prevalent through small professional and NCO officer corps is considered substitute system of security check and control file on officers of NCOs.

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